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巴罗谈民主的决定因素(2):引言部分  

2009-05-03 14:52:45|  分类: 默认分类 |  标签: |举报 |字号 订阅

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Determinants of Democracy

 

一、引言


An expansion of political freedom——more democracy——has opposing effects oneconomic growth. On the positive side, democratic institutions provide a checkon governmental power and thereby limit the potential of public officials toamass personal wealth and to carry out unpopular policies. But on the negativeside, more democracy encourages rich-to-poor redistributions of income and mayenhance the power of interest groups. Consequently, the net effect of democracyon growth is uncertain. (See Sirowy and Inkeles [1990] and Przeworski andLimongi [1993] for surveys of theories that relate democracy to economicgrowth.)

 

政治自由的扩张(即更多民主),对经济增长,具有反作用。从积极的意义上看,民主机制,制衡了政府权力,因而,限制了公共官员聚敛个人财富的可能,限制了不得人心的政府的实行。但是,从消极的意义上看,更多的民主,鼓励了收入从富人向穷人的再分配,可能会强化利益集团的权力。因此,民主对增长的净效应,并不肯定。(见SirowyInkeles[1990]PrzeworskiLimongi[1993],他们对“民主-经济增长”的所有理论,进行了研究。)

 

My previous cross-country empirical work, assummarized in Barro (1997), finds a nonlinear effect of democracy on growth.Growth is initially increasing in an index of electoral rights, but therelation turnsnegative once a moderate amount of rights has been attained. One way tointerpret these results is that, in the worst dictatorships, an increase indemocracy tends to stimulate growth because the benefit from limitations ongovernmental power is the key matter. But in places that have already achieveda moderate amount of democracy, a further increase impairs growth because thedominant effect comes from the intensified concern with social programs thatredistribute resources.

 

我以前的跨国实证研究(见Barro(1997)的总结),发现:民主对增长的效应,是非线性的。民主开始随选举权指数而增加,但是,一旦达到某个数量的权利之后,这个关系就变成了负值。有一种办法,可以解释这些结果:在最差的独裁状态下,民主的增加,会刺激增长,因为限制政府权力所带来的收益是关键问题。但是,若早已达到了某个度上的民主,则,民主的进一步增加,就会妨碍增长,因为这时,人们对“资源再分配”的社会程序,会更加关注,这是它的主要效应。

 

The present analysis focuses on the reverse channel,that is, the impact of economic development on a country's propensity toexperience democracy. A common view since Lipset's (1959) research is thatprosperity stimulates democracy; this idea is often called the Lipsethypothesis. Lipset credits the idea to Aristotle: "From Aristotle down tothe present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relativelyfew citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass ofthe population could intelligently participate in politics and could developthe self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals ofirresponsible demagogues" (p. 75). (For a statement of Aristotle's views,see Aristotle [1932, book 6].)

 

现在的这个分析,侧重于研究“反作用”部分,即:经济增长对国家的民主倾向的影响。自Lipset(1959)的研究以来,一个共识就是:繁荣会刺激民主;这个共识被称作“李浦塞假说”(Lipset Hypothesis)。 Lipset将之归功于亚里士多德,他说:“自亚里士多德以降,直至而今,人们一直以为,惟有富裕社会,惟有处于真实贫困状态之市民数量相对较少,大多数人方可有智慧参与政治,方可约束自我以避免受到不负责任之煽动的盅惑。人们视此为必要条件。”(关于亚里士多德的说法,见亚里士多德[1932,第六卷]。)

 

Theoretical models of the effect of economic conditionson the extent of democracy are not well developed. Lipset (1959, pp. 83- 84)emphasized increased education and an enlarged middle class as key elements,and he also stressed Tocqueville's (1835) idea that private organizations andinstitutions are important as checks on centralized government power. Thispoint has been extended by Putnam (1993), who argues that the propensity forcivic activity is the key underpinning of good government in the regions of Italy. ForHuber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens (1993, pp. 74-75), the crucial concept isthat capitalist development lowers the power of the landlord class and raisesthe power and ability to organize of the working and middle classes.

经济条件对民主程度的影响,并没有很好的理论模型。Lipset(1959, pp.83-84)强调指出:增加教育和扩张中产阶级,为关键要素;而且,他还强调了法国政治学家托克维尔(1835)的观点:私人组织和体制的重要性,即体现为衡约集权政府之权力。Putnam(1993)将此观点进行了引申,他认为:公民行动的倾向,是意大利地区出现好政府的关键性决定因素。HuberRueschemeyerStephens(1993 pp. 74-75),提出的关键观念是:资本主义的发展,削弱了地主阶级的权力,提高了工人阶级和中产阶级的组织能力。

 

In some models, an autocrat would voluntarilyrelinquish some authority-for example, by establishing a constitution,empowering a legislature, expanding voting rights, and extending civilliberties- in order to deter revolution and to encourage the private sector toinvest (and, thereby, to expand the pie that the government can tax). Boone(1996) develops a model along these lines and determines the equilibrium amountof freedom by considering the net benefits of oppression to potential rulers.However, in this type of setting, most effects turn out to be ambiguous. Forexample, an increase in human capital raises the people's ability to resistoppression but also raises the ruler's benefits from subjugating them.Similarly, a rise in urbanization makes it easier for people to meet andcommunicate-which presumably makes them harder to suppress-but also makes iteasier for an autocrat to monitor and control activities.

 

有一些模型,将它的“独裁者”设定为会自愿“削权”的人。譬如,通过立宪、赋权于议会、扩张投票权、扩张公民自由,等等。以此来延缓革命,以此来鼓励私人部门的投资(因而,也扩张了政府征税的基础)。Boone(1996)按这样的思路建立了一个模型。他考虑了反击潜在的统治者的净得益,并确定了均衡的自由度。然而,在这一类的模型设定中,有大量的效应,被证明是模糊不清的。譬如,人力资本的增加,会提高人们反抗压迫的能力,但是,也提高了统治者从征服中所得到的好处。同样地,城市化使人们更易于聚会,更易于交流。理论上说,这会让人们更难以被压迫,但是,它也会让独裁者更易于监控人们的行动。


Despite the lack of clear predictions fromtheoretical models, the cross-country evidence examined in the present studyconfirms that the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis is a strong empirical regularity.In particular, increases in various measures of the standard of living forecasta gradual rise in democracy. In contrast, democracies that arise without prioreconomic development-sometimes because they are imposed by former colonialpowers or international organizations-tend not to last. Given the strength ofthis empirical regularity, one would think that clear-cut theoretical analysesought also to be attainable. (This seems to be a case in which the analysisworks better in practice than in theory.)

虽然理论模型并没有明确的预见,但是,本研究中的跨国证据,却说明:李浦塞假说,是一个很强的经验规律。特别地,对生活水平的各种量度的增加,会预见到民主的渐进增加。相反,没有预先的经济发展,而产生的民主(有时是来自于以前的殖民当局的强加,或来自于国际组织的强加),却不会持久。因为存在这样强的实证规律性,所以,我们应该可以也可以找到一个明确的理论分配的。(实际情况是:相对于理论建设来说,这个分析对实践更有效力。)

 

 

附:书评者的意见

 

The democracy and inflation chapters have anotherflaw in common. Neither devotes adequate attention to placing Barro's findingsin the context of related literature, such as Fischer's (1993) work oninflation and growth or the work of Helliwell (1994) or Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) on democracy, income, and growth.

“民主”与“通胀”两章,有一个共同的瑕疵。这两章都没有足够注意将巴罗的发现放到相关的文献中去,如Fischer1993)对通胀和增长的研究,或Helliwell(1994)、或BurkhartLewis-Beck(1994)对“民主、收入和增长”的研究。

 

(待续)

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